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Abstract
This article suggests to view peer review as a social interaction problem and shows reasons for social simulators to investigate
it. Although essential for science, peer review is largely understudied and current attempts to reform it are not supported by
scientiﬁc evidence. We suggest that there is room for social simulation to ﬁll this gap by spotlighting social mechanisms behind
peer review at the microscope and understanding their implications for the science system. In particular, social simulation could
help to understand why voluntary peer review works at all, explore the relevance of social sanctions and reputational motives
to increase the commitment of agents involved, cast light on the economic cost of this institution for the science system and
understand the inﬂuence of signals and social networks in determining biases in the reviewing process. Finally, social
simulation could help to test policy scenarios to maximise the efﬁcacy and efﬁciency of various peer review schemes under
speciﬁc circumstances and for everyone involved.
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 Why peer review is important for science
1.1 Peer review is one of the most important facets that makes science a complex social system. It became the cornerstone of
science from when in 1752 the Royal Society of London obtained the ﬁscal responsibility for Philosophical Transactions and
peers were systematically and voluntarily involved to contribute to the quality and excellence of their publications. Now, it is
applied to many spheres of scientiﬁc activity such as funding, publication, recruitment and even research productivity evaluation.
It is essential for institutional agencies in evaluating research grants, for journal and book editors to evaluate the quality of
submissions, for scientists to increase the quality of their work, as well as for policy makers to guarantee that taxpayer money is
invested in a credible and well functioning system (Squazzoni 2010).
1.2 More importantly, peer review encapsulates the very idea of science that new lines of research are experimentally pursued by
scientists through a continuous, decentralised and socially shared trial and error process. It therefore helps science to be self-
regulated by determining scientiﬁc pay-offs. It directly or indirectly determines how funds and carriers are allocated in science
and therefore makes a big difference every day.
1.3 Although peer review can take different forms, it can generally be deﬁned as a distributed and decentralised mechanism that
makes evaluation and improvement of complex scientiﬁc products possible through voluntary and impersonal cooperation
among peers. Scientists interact in different roles as journal editors, authors and reviewers. This intensive interaction is guided
by a complex set of socially shared norms and values that are the essence of the 'scientiﬁc method'. The normative foundations
of science include the importance of communalism, universalism, disinterestedness and organised scepticism (Merton 1973), but
we can also add the objective search for truth, respect for evidence, tolerance, trust and reputation among peers (Durant and
Ibrahim 2011).
What are the problems?
2.1 In our view, there are at least three reasons that require a large scale involvement of social simulation in science and peer review
investigation. First, there is evidence that peer review and evaluation in science generally are now under increasing strain. The
tremendous expansion of speciﬁc topics, interdisciplinary research and the increasing sophistication of research technologies on
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one hand and the growing number of journals, conferences and funding agencies on the other, make peer review extremely
difﬁcult and largely overexploited (Alberts, Hanson and Kelner 2008). The continuous stratiﬁcation of the scientiﬁc community
into a mosaic of specialties and the consequent growth of inter-disciplinary collaboration have increased knowledge asymmetries
between editors, reviewers and authors, and so the likelihood of cheating and moral hazards. This has complicated the
management of peer review and undermined the possibility of evaluating research proposals and journal submissions
appropriately through individually isolated peer review (Grainger 2007).
2.2 A recent survey found that there were approximately 1,346,000 peer-reviewed scientiﬁc journal articles published world-wide in
2006, with approximately 70% covered by ISI (Björk, Roos and Lauri 2009). About the same ﬁgure was found by Elsevier in an
answer to a UK House of Commons' committee in 2004. As the scientiﬁc journal publishing market is estimated to growing
steadily at about 3.5% annually since the 1970s (estimation on 2001, Mabe and Amin 2001), we can realise the over-exploitation
of this important mechanism, not to mention the case of books, research grants, universities and research institutes' productivity
evaluation where peer review is also involved. Moreover, the expected world-wide convergence towards an Anglo-American
competitive model to allocate resources in science (particularly for funding) and the increase in detail and spheres where peer
evaluation is presumably massively applied, will increase even further its present exploitation. In short, there are strong reasons
to doubt that voluntary, uncompensated peer review can go on efﬁciently bearing it present burden without reform. Therefore,
investigating peer review is fundamental to understand how to exploit this important mechanism more efﬁciently without
deteriorating it.
2.3 Secondly, if some reform is needed, this should follow scientiﬁc evidence. It is therefore frustrating to see that peer review
mechanisms are dramatically under-investigated (e.g., Kassirer and Campion 1994; Horrobin 2001; Smith 2006). There are
anecdotes, personal memories of journal editors and rare investigations on speciﬁc cases (e.g., Alberts, Hanson and Kelner
2008; Lamont 2009; Pulvener 2010), but no robust experimental and theoretical knowledge. It seems that scientists devote
extended efforts to investigate everything except those particular evaluation mechanisms that make science what it is.
2.4 Of course, one may say that this is not a problem. As a matter of fact, over centuries of evolution of science, we have cumulated
experience and discovered practices, standards and technologies that have helped us to guide evaluation and peer review
toward efﬁcient and socially shared criteria. Therefore, why bother studying it? The problem is that we have evidence of certain
peer review deﬁciencies in guaranteeing the quality and efﬁciency of evaluation processes and preventing scientiﬁc misconduct
(e.g., Bornmann and Daniel 2005; Couzin 2006; Mayo et al. 2006; Nature 2006). Smith (1997; 2006) indicated that peer review is
a "black box" with very little knowledge on the beneﬁts or serious evidence on deﬁciencies. Horrobin (2001) argued that "a
process that is central to the scientiﬁc endeavour as peer review has no validated experimental base". Therefore, we think that
there is room for social simulation to ﬁll this gap by examining peer review, spotlighting social mechanisms behind it at the
microscope and understanding their implications for the science system.
2.5 Thirdly, we believe that there is interest in this discussion as many journal editors funding agencies have warned us about the
need for revising peer review. Certain attempts to introduce measures to improve the situation have followed trial and error
approaches (Squazzoni 2010). Recently, from the authoritative columns of Science, Alberts, Hanson and Kelner (2008) have
suggested the need for seriously looking at peer review to improve its efﬁciency and guarantee its sustainability. In short, peer
review is also a policy problem which has not yet been seriously addressed scientiﬁcally.
How can social simulation help?
3.1 If this is the case, what can social simulation do, given its focus on modelling social interaction and human behaviour? We think it
can do a lot. Among the aspects that are worth investigating, the most important are the following (please, bear in mind that we
are sociologists and consequently this list may be biased).
3.2 First, social simulation could help to improve our understanding of why voluntary peer review works at all. Inspired by the
literature on the emergence of voluntary cooperation (e.g., Axelrod 1984; 1997) and the emergence of social norms (Axelrod
1986; Coleman 1986), social simulators could study how the seemingly irrational voluntary commitment of editors and reviewers
could emerge and investigate the speciﬁc norms internalized by peers. The fragility of peer review against amoral behaviour of
the agents involved (particularly reviewers) has been recently investigated by a noticeable agent-based model that indicated that
even a small fraction of unfair agents can drastically lower the quality of publications (Thurner and Hanel 2010). We think that the
well-recognised social simulation literature on cooperation and social norms might help to ﬁnd measures to increase the strength
of norms for more robust cooperation in peer review. We think that the Merton-inspired "middle-range models" capable of
combining theoretical intuitions and evidence on well-speciﬁed empirical puzzles could be extremely beneﬁcial to understand the
peculiarities of peer review mechanisms.
3.3 Secondly, following Hauser and Fehr (2007), social simulation could also help to explore the relevance of social sanctions and
reputational motives to increase the commitment of agents involved. On the one hand, the sanction-side of cooperation in peer
review—against lazy or unfair reviewers or unreliable authors—is largely unexploited by journals or research funding agencies,
while evidence unequivocally demonstrates its crucial relevance (e.g., Gintis 2000). On the other hand, while reputational
incentives might guide authors and editors, the current practice of peer review does not allow for reviewer reputation building. As
we know that reputation is one of the most efﬁcient engines of cooperation (e.g., Wedekind and Milinski 2000), it is time to explore
what are the consequences of adjustments in reputational beneﬁts provision for reviewers. Obviously, these investigations could
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also have important policy implications as they could suggest measures for journals to improve reviewer reliability and
consequently to enforce author/investigator fairness.
3.4 Thirdly and more generally, social simulation could help to cast light on the economic cost of peer review for the science system.
There is interesting literature on the so-called "grant mania" that shows the incredible lost research productivity for the science
system. This is due to the time spent in grant applications and reviewing (e.g., Spier 2002; Goldsworty 2009; Gordon and Poulin
2009; Schaffer 2009). Abstract social simulation models could easily look at important aspects of this. Some examples could be
the macro consequences of the trade-off between publishing and reviewing, alternative economic resource allocation schemes,
such as peer review, bibliometric indexes, equally distributed baseline grants and the speciﬁc circumstances one scheme is
better than another.
3.5 Another objective for social simulation could be to understand the inﬂuence of signals and social networks in determining biases
in the reviewing process. We know that the so-called "old-boyism" is strongly affected by the social embeddedness of scientists
and we also know that gender and other signals might strongly bias reviewing (e.g., Bornmann and Daniel 2005; Obrecht,
Tibelius and D'Aloiso 2007). An interesting example exists where an agent-based model was build to examine the effect of social
inﬂuence on scientists' behaviour (Martins 2010). However this should be done more precisely for reviewing. Investigations
about the social embeddedness of the review process could help to ﬁnd answers to some basic questions of the philosophy of
science. Some examples could be: how can major discoveries break through the "old-boys" barriers? How is the social
hierarchy maintained in science and how does it develop over time?
3.6 Finally, social simulation could help to test policy scenarios to maximise the efﬁcacy and efﬁciency of various peer review
schemes under speciﬁc circumstances and for everyone involved. For instance, it is reasonable to suppose that journal editors,
authors and reviewers have conﬂicting interests. While editors might be interested in receiving severe judgments from experts to
defend the prestige of their journals, submission authors might be interested in receiving a fair treatment, justiﬁed judgments and
well-detailed reviewer reports that help them to improve the quality of their work (e.g., Schwartz and Zamboanga 2009). These
conﬂicting objectives, far from being simultaneously taken into account, are not often even fairly contemplated presently. If we
look at the reviewers' side, there is evidence that reviewing effort follows a Pareto-like distribution, in which a few scientists are
responsible for the large majority of submission reviews. A survey conducted in 2007 on a sample of 3,000 scientists showed
that most active reviewers covered about 80% of all reviews, with an average of 14 reviews per year (Ware 2007). Therefore,
models that can test measures to distribute the reviewing effort more equally without losing reliability and quality, would be
welcomed. It is worth noting that these policy analyses could also help to improve the web-platforms currently used by many of
us to manage peer review in journals and conferences. This would allow editors to set up reviewing schemes that maximise their
objectives and guarantee efﬁcient reviewing.
3.7 This said, given that many datasets already exist (e.g., in journal and conference submissions), a strong recommendation is not
only to approach this topic through abstract if important theoretical models, but also to work with empirically grounded models. To
do so, it might be essential to collaborate with experts in the ﬁeld (e.g., economists and science sociologists), and involve
relevant stakeholders, such as journal editors, conference chairs and research funding managers, in joint research. Firstly,
models are more informative when addressed to well-speciﬁed empirical puzzles and grounded on empirical data. Secondly, by
involving experts in the ﬁeld, besides reducing of the risk of reinventing the wheel, social simulation could become accepted in
other well-established communities. Thirdly, by collaborating, we could prove that policy analysis can beneﬁt from modelling and
understanding social interaction in complex systems, such as science (e.g., Squazzoni and Boero 2010).
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